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Reconsidering Home Rule and City-State 
Preemption in Abandoned Fields of Law 
Franklin R. Guenthner∗ 
  INTRODUCTION   
Phoenix, Arizona, is stuck. In 2015, the city of over one mil-
lion people1 recognized the growing impact of climate change,2 
and the need for sound energy policy at a municipal level.3 Local 
officials considered passing local energy benchmarking legisla-
tion, whereby buildings above a certain size would report their 
energy consumption, allowing tenants to choose whether to sup-
port a building’s carbon footprint.4 Before lawmakers could even 
propose the ordinance, however, the state legislature passed a 
law prohibiting any city in the state, including Phoenix, from 
passing such laws.5 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like 
to thank Professor Myron Orfield for helping focus my initial ideas for this Note 
through his teaching, and for coining the term abandoning the field. Thanks 
also to Professor Kristin Hickman, Professor Christopher Soper, Hannah Nel-
son, Joe Janochoski, and Jacob Harksen for their feedback, the staff and editors 
of Minnesota Law Review for their contributions, and my family for their sup-
port. Copyright  2017 by Franklin R. Guenthner. 
 1. QuickFacts: Phoenix city, Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www 
.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/phoenixcityarizona/PST045216 (last updated 
July 1, 2016). 
 2. For an overview of municipal contributions and responses to the grow-
ing climate crisis, see generally Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and the Governing of 
Climate Change, 35 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 229 (2010). 
 3. In a recent interview, the Mayor of Phoenix, Greg Stanton, explained 
that “[c]limate change is affecting Phoenix, Arizona, as much as any other big 
city in the United States of America right now[,] [n]ot in the future,” thus spur-
ring the conversation for local laws that could tackle the problem. Henry Gra-
bar, Phoenix Has Beef with Arizona, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2016) http://www.slate 
.com/articles/business/metropolis/2016/09/phoenix_mayor_greg_stanton_is_ 
fed_up_with_arizona_pre_empting_his_city_s.html. 
 4. ASU ENERGY POLICY INNOVATION COUNCIL, ARIZONA’S PROHIBITION 
ON REQUIREMENT OF ENERGY MEASURING AND REPORTING 1 (2015). 
 5. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.36 (2016). There is skepticism at the mu-
nicipal level whether this bill has any motivations beyond the purely political. 
Stanton believes that “[j]ust the conversation about adopting the policy spurred 
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This practice—states passing laws that block local govern-
ments from enacting ordinances—is commonly referred to as 
preemption,6 and Phoenix is not the only city feeling its effects. 
As large cities around the country comprise larger proportions of 
their states’ populations, they face new challenges in climate 
change and energy,7 paid sick leave,8 LGBT rights,9 and access 
to basic services,10 to name a few. But rather than empower their 
political subdivisions to tackle these issues on their own, the par-
ent states of many cities are passing laws that prohibit them 
from doing just that,11 even where no state statutes on those is-
sues may yet exist.12 In North Carolina, the state legislature has 
passed a series of laws that nullify a Charlotte ordinance ban-
ning LGBT discrimination and creating transgender bathroom 
accommodations.13 In Minnesota, recent court decisions have 
overturned municipal charter amendments to raise the mini-
mum wage and require police officers to carry personal liability 
 
the Legislature to ban cities from engaging in it.” Grabar, supra note 3. In other 
words, the state bill was not motivated by the need to exact statewide policy. 
The state simply prohibited the regulation and walked away. Arizona has yet 
to pass similar legislation regarding even market-based energy bills like the 
Phoenix ordinance. 
 6. See NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN 
AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 3 (2017) (defining 
preemption as “the use of state law to nullify a municipal ordinance or author-
ity”). 
 7. See Grabar, supra note 3. The same law that prohibits energy bench-
marking also prohibits municipalities from regulating the use of disposable 
bags, in response to an attempt to pass a local ordinance in Tempe banning the 
use of plastic bags in grocery and other retail stores. See Mike Sunnucks, Ari-
zona Legislature Approves Ban on Plastic Bag Bans, Energy Mandates (Again), 
PHX. BUS. J. (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2016/ 
03/14/arizona-legislature-approves-ban-on-plastic-bag.html. 
 8. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCES, ch. 40, art. I–III (2016). 
 9. See Steve Harrison, Charlotte City Council Approves LGBT Protections 
in 7–4 Vote, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www 
.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article61786967.html.  
 10. See Alia Beard Rau, Republican Bill Would Halt Phoenix Plan to Issue 
IDs to Undocumented Immigrants, Others, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 13, 2016), 
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2016/01/13/legislation 
-would-handcuff-phoenix-id-card-efforts/78748916/.html. 
 11. See DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 4 (mapping the numerous states 
and wide range of areas of law where states currently preempt cities from act-
ing). 
 12. See Grabar, supra note 3. 
 13. See 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 2017-4. The 2017 law repealed a 2016 statute 
that also preempted all city ordinances regarding public accommodations, but 
was more widely criticized for requirements it imposed on government re-
strooms. See 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 2016-3. 
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insurance.14 And in Arizona, a new law is attempting to make 
state preemption against all local legislation the status quo. 
That law allows any legislator to propose to the Arizona Attorney 
General that a local ordinance has violated state law.15 If the 
Attorney General agrees, that city loses its state funding for the 
entire fiscal year.16 
Preemption as a legislative tool is not a novel legal concept. 
Just as the federal government can preempt state law that di-
rectly conflicts with it,17 states have long been able to pass their 
own uniform laws that bind all localities to one statewide pol-
icy.18 The legal trend in the cities discussed above, however, has 
been toward parent political bodies passing preemptive laws 
without prescribing affirmative policies to replace the newly de-
funct ordinances, effectively abandoning the field of law and nul-
lifying it at the local level.19 The consequence is a signal to cities 
across these states that they are powerless to find their own so-
lutions to issues that directly impact them—and, in extreme 
cases, to chill future local legislation altogether.20 
This Note explores the limits of city-state preemption when 
states abandon the field in a particular area of law. Looking at 
the city-state relationships outlined above in Arizona, Minne-
sota, and North Carolina, it argues that the traditional bounda-
ries of local power need to be reconsidered in light of the evolving 
challenges modern cities are facing. It also evaluates the legal 
 
 14. See Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 2016) (per 
curiam); Order Dismissing Petition, Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, No. 27-CV-
16-11839 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016); Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus, Mann v. Minneapolis City Council, No. 27-CV-13-13029 (Dist. Ct. 
Minn. Nov. 12, 2013). 
 15. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (2016). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citing 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992)) (reiterating that 
“[s]tate action may be foreclosed by express language in a congressional enact-
ment”). 
 18. As discussed in Part I, infra, city-state preemption became a matter of 
federal constitutional law in the landmark decision of Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 
U.S. 161 (1907). 
 19. See, e.g., § 9-500.38 (prohibiting cities from imposing taxes or fees on 
the use of disposable bags, but further prohibiting any legislation regarding the 
use of reusable containers made out of various materials such as cloth, and not 
proposing any positive policies to address environmental concerns raised in the 
local bill that prompted the preemptive bill in the first place); see also Grabar, 
supra note 3. 
 20. See Grabar, supra note 3 (discussing the “chilling effect” that preemp-
tive laws have on “cities’ abilities to be laboratories of experimentation about 
big public policy”). 
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doctrine of home rule immunity and shows how constitutional 
charter authority can shield cities from preemptive state legisla-
tion that does not itself demonstrate a legitimate state interest 
in a preempted area of law. Part I outlines the history of home 
rule amendments and the specific characteristics in them that 
allow cities to be immune from certain state interference. Part II 
analyzes the effectiveness of home rule immunity where a state 
government has abandoned the field within the context of the 
states listed above. Part III reexamines these examples to pre-
scribe the legal framework that cities should advance in chal-
lenging various preemptive statutes. Ultimately, this Note pro-
poses that, in home rule cities where state preemptive statutes 
do not sufficiently demonstrate a pressing statewide concern 
over areas of law already occupied at the local level, courts 
should adopt a rebuttable presumption that the parent political 
body has abandoned the field, and that local law controls. 
I.  TRACING THE HISTORY OF HOME RULE IMMUNITY   
Modern American cities owe much of their defined legisla-
tive powers to a single Supreme Court decision that, ironically, 
declared them essentially powerless unless a state gives them 
plenary legislative abilities.21 The backlash against this decision 
provoked many states to adopt home rule amendments, whereby 
cities could pass their own local legislation in certain enumer-
ated areas. This Part discusses the extent to which these amend-
ments also protect a city’s ability to pass legislation that is purely 
local. Section A explores the effect of the landmark decision in 
Hunter v. Pittsburgh on the modern city-state relationship. Sec-
tions B and C discuss Dillon’s Rule and special legislation, re-
spectively, and how these provided legal context for the decision 
in Hunter. Section D outlines the home rule movement as a re-
sponse to these legal concepts, and the extent to which the fram-
ers of such provisions intended to protect purely local activities 
from state interference. 
A. HUNTER V. PITTSBURGH AND THE CITY AS A “CREATURE OF 
THE STATE” 
Before 1907, the Supreme Court had not established a clear 
power structure between cities and states. Since the Revolution, 
courts had regarded American cities as quasi-private corpora-
 
 21. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
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tions. While maintaining the democratic characteristics of gov-
ernments through elected representation, cities still allowed cit-
izens to protect local interests beyond the power of a state or fed-
eral government. Still, courts were confused on how to fully 
define the rights of cities in relation to other organizations.22 In 
1819, the Supreme Court decided, in Trustees of Dartmouth v. 
Woodward, that the distinction between “public” and “private” 
corporations rested largely on the scope of property rights.23 This 
holding still left cities in a somewhat undefined constitutional 
category, however.24 The Court held that public corporations 
“are such only as are founded by the government for public pur-
poses, where the whole interests belong also to the government,” 
thus leaving the private corporation label a possibility for cities 
that did not meet this definition.25 This uncertainty created a 
blank slate on which the Supreme Court could imbue cities with 
whatever level of independence it saw fit. 
The Supreme Court finally crafted a bright line definition 
for city-state relations in Hunter v. Pittsburgh.26 In Hunter, the 
town of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, challenged a state law that al-
lowed consolidation of two adjoining localities on a majority vote 
of the populations of both towns.27 The combined majority of both 
localities had voted for the measure to consolidate, even though 
the majority of voters in Allegheny had voted against it.28 Alle-
gheny argued that the state law allowing the vote deprived them 
of their property without due process, as their tax burden would 
increase after the town was folded into the larger municipality.29 
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to 
compel the consolidation. While acknowledging that the public-
private distinction in defining municipal corporate power was 
ambiguous, the Court did not feel it necessary to rehash prior 
decisions delineating the full list of the rights of cities and their 
 
 22. See GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT 
BUILDING WALLS 38–45 (1999). 
 23. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 668–69 
(1819) (“Another division of corporations is into public and private. Public cor-
porations are generally esteemed such as exist for public political purposes only, 
such as towns, cities, parishes, and counties; and in many respects they are so, 
although they involve some private interests . . . .”). 
 24. See FRUG, supra note 22 (noting the ambiguity of the holding in Wood-
ward). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Hunter, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 176. 
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“citizens and creditors.”30 Instead, the Court found it sufficient 
to proclaim that “[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivi-
sions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising 
such of the governmental powers of the State as may be en-
trusted to them.”31 Because of this relationship, the Court rea-
soned, “[t]he number, nature, and duration” of all of a munici-
pality’s powers “rests in the absolute discretion of the State.”32 
While the precise contours of a municipality’s rights and powers 
had not been fully articulated after Hunter, it was at least clear 
that cities would henceforth be considered “creatures of the 
state” as a matter of federal constitutional law.33 
B. DILLON’S RULE AND THE TRADITIONAL CITY-STATE 
RELATIONSHIP 
The pivotal decision in Hunter was the culmination of a long 
battle at the state court level over how to frame the relationship 
between municipalities and their parent governments. By the 
late nineteenth century, the popular view among state courts 
was that cities should at most serve “as a limited coordinating 
mechanism through which property owners could secure their 
investments from public interference, rather than as a public 
agent through which the people could collectively plan a new so-
ciety.”34 The rejection of a model that treated cities as public en-
tities capable of broad autonomy necessitated a clear expression 
of how states could limit municipal power.35 First published in 
1872, John Dillon’s Municipal Corporations became the most 
popular articulation of the traditional, or “state creature,” city-
state model.36 While not every jurisdiction has officially adopted 
Dillon’s Rule, its passing approval in the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Hunter37 demonstrates its relevance in understanding 
the modern city-state relationship. 
Dillon’s Rule established two important tenets of local gov-
ernment power. First, a municipality could exercise only those 
 
 30. Id. at 178. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978); City 
of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 34. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2283 
(2003). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See JOHN DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448 (5th ed. 1911). 
 37. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). 
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powers that were either: (1) granted in express words; (2) “nec-
essarily or fairly implied in or incident to” those express grants 
of power; or (3) “essential” to the goals of the municipal corpora-
tion.38 Second, these powers, when granted, were to be narrowly 
construed by courts, thus minimizing city power beyond only the 
clearest of intent on the part of the state.39 When read in con-
junction with the holding in Hunter, Dillon’s Rule has since pro-
vided a legal framework in which a city can only pass certain 
ordinances if it has received express authority from its state leg-
islature. State legislatures nationwide capitalized on this fully 
articulated framework. The drafting of Dillon’s Rule and its 
adoption into many state constitutions led to a wave of special 
legislation that targeted the affairs of specific cities.40 Yet even 
as this device promoted a traditional city-state model in a pow-
erful way, it also spawned the movement that pushed back 
against it. 
C. THE RISE OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION 
Dillon’s Rule and Hunter created a prohibitive framework 
that allowed state legislatures to pass laws targeting cities indi-
vidually.41 As the acceptance of the state creature view of cities 
gained hold over American jurisprudence, urban reformers be-
came increasingly concerned with attempts by state legislators 
to interfere with local issues.42 The system that was designed to 
create defined and separate roles for state and city in fact led to 
a power imbalance in favor of the state over city. 
The premise that cities were mere creatures of the state legislature 
seemed only to encourage state legislators to think of local power as an 
extension of their own power. It also encouraged those local factions 
seeking a more interventionist local governmental climate to look to 
the state legislature for assistance at home. Even if Dillon’s Rule could 
check city governments’ independent efforts to grant franchises to cer-
tain private interests, for example, it could not stop the state legisla-
ture from validating such local actions. . . . Thus, a strong legal pre-
sumption of state supremacy could easily be understood to entwine 
local matters ever more deeply with state legislative politics and thus 
 
 38. DILLON, supra note 36, at 448. 
 39. See id. at 455.  
 40. See FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 166 (6th ed. 2015) (“[The 
state creature model] encouraged state legislators to intervene in the affairs of 
municipalities, not only as a class, but also individually. As urban centers began 
to grow in the nineteenth century, legislators increasingly began to enact spe-
cial laws that targeted particular cities.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Barron, supra note 34, at 2286. 
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to assist the state legislative grab for political and economic spoils that 
urban growth precipitated.43 
This newfound state power over cities resulted in an increase in 
state legislatures passing special legislation that, rather than 
applying to all municipalities in a jurisdiction, targeted individ-
ual cities, effectively displacing municipal decisions to the state 
level.44 Urban reformers who saw this new device as a problem 
pushed for, and in many cases achieved, state constitutional 
bans on such laws.45 Limiting state legislative power by requir-
ing them to pass general legislation was thus seen as an attempt 
to “preserve the idealized and limited local sphere that Dillon 
hoped to protect.”46 
Even these constitutional limits, however, ultimately 
proved insufficient to protect against the state-creature model. 
In response to the bans on special legislation, state lawmakers 
passed artfully worded laws that had the appearance of a gen-
eral provision, but in practice still targeted individual locali-
ties.47 Meanwhile, state courts were mostly willing to approve of 
such legislative ingenuity.48 By the time the Supreme Court le-
gitimized the state-creature model of American cities in 1907, 
there was a growing sense among those who wanted to preserve 
a local sphere of governance to cities that new constitutional 
schemes would be needed.49 The ensuing debate would be over 
whether these frameworks should preserve a private role for cit-
ies, or create a new avenue of local self-governance. 
 
 43. Barron, supra note 34, at 2286–87. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 2287–88. 
 46. Id. at 2288. 
 47. Some of these laws were less targeted at individual localities than oth-
ers. See N.Y. GEN MUN. LAW § 101 (McKinney 2008) (requiring construction pro-
jects above three million dollars in certain counties in New York to “prepare 
separate specifications” for various “subdivisions” involved in the project, but 
lowering the dollar amount threshold for such specifications in projects that 
take place in other counties). The constitutionality of this law was challenged 
and upheld in Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. 
v. Smith, 992 N.E.2d 1067 (N.Y. 2013). 
 48. See Barron, supra note 34, at 2288 (citing Gerald E. Frug, The City as 
a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1108–13 (1980)); see also, e.g., Chi. Nat’l 
League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. 1985) (approving a 
general law that subjected all stadiums “in a city with more than 1,000,000 in-
habitants, in a stadium in which . . . nighttime events were not played prior to 
July 1, 1982,” to noise pollution regulations, even though it in effect could only 
be applied to one municipality and stadium in the state). 
 49. See Barron, supra note 34, at 2288. 
 2017] CITY–STATE PREEMPTION 435 
 
D. THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT 
At the same time that Hunter and Dillon’s Rule were en-
trenching the state creature model as the consensus view on city 
power, city populations were doubling in size every decade.50 
With this new reality came new challenges. Reformers had to 
find ways to address issues in taxing, housing, sanitation, and 
other administrative concerns, in spite of a model that deprived 
them of the flexibility to act without express permission from a 
parent political body.51 Home rule amendments ultimately 
emerged as a method for preserving the local sphere of power for 
the modern city.52 This Section explores this movement in mu-
nicipal government reform in further detail. 
1. Theoretical Underpinnings and Defining Local Concern 
Missouri became the first state to institute a home rule 
amendment to its constitution in 1875.53 The amendment al-
lowed any city with a population of more than 100,000 residents 
to “frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and 
subject to the Constitution and laws of [the] State.”54 Thus, the 
charter allowed cities for the first time to structure themselves 
by a “foundational governing document,” without an express 
grant from a state legislature.55 The divergent motivations for 
this new grant of municipal authority, however, were not solely 
focused on “local power for its own sake.”56 Rather, the overrid-
ing desire to achieve good government meant that the push for 
home rule created different theories on what local concern 
should look like.57 This division led to an array of actual home 
rule amendments that could allow courts to reach different con-
clusions about what belonged to municipal governance, and 
what belonged to the state. 
 
 50. See id. at 2289 (citing ROBERT E. FOGLESONG, PLANNING THE CAPITAL-
IST CITY: THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE 1920S 60 (1986); ARTHUR MEIER SCHLE-
SINGER, THE RISE OF THE CITY, 1878–1898, at 64, 68 (1933)). 
 51. Id. (citing DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS 
IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 112–208 (1998)). 
 52. See FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 175 (noting that Missouri became 
the first state to adopt a home rule provision in 1875). 
 53. MO. CONST. OF 1875, art. IX, § 16. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Barron, supra note 34, at 2290. 
 56. Id. at 2291. 
 57. Id. 
 436 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:427 
 
a. The McBain Nine and the Conservative Approach 
Many reformers who supported the home rule movement did 
so not because they thought it would usher in a new wave of ex-
pansive municipal power. Rather, they saw it as a way of pre-
serving the limited functionality of cities that had been legiti-
mized by Dillon’s Rule, while also curbing expanding state 
interference that threatened to undermine this traditional rela-
tionship.58 The simultaneous concern that: (1) the great cities 
were gaining too much power over taxing and spending, rather 
than protecting private property interests as cities had tradition-
ally been responsible for; and (2) state legislative influence 
would corrupt the local self-determination that had made such 
protection possible in the first place, required a new model to 
preserve the status quo.59 Thus, home rule amendments were to 
be limited to charter-making abilities, with states only able to 
confer authority over what was considered “of traditionally ‘local’ 
concern” as prescribed by what Dillon had termed the “usual 
range.”60 The role of state courts would be to “police th[e] 
boundar[ies]” between state and local in their interpretations of 
constitutional home rule amendments.61 Furthermore, provi-
sions requiring any additional grants of power be general would 
limit state legislatures’ abilities to either alter or expand these 
powers, in some cases wholly removing local matters from con-
sideration at the state level.62 
There are few indicators of what exactly this usual range 
was intended to entail. As some commentators have noted, leav-
ing the power of interpreting what was appropriately local and 
what belonged exclusively to state consideration in the hands of 
state courts did not prevent “an adventurous city” from “as-
sert[ing] home rule authority in unanticipated ways.”63 It also 
 
 58. Id. at 2294. 
 59. See id. at 2294–95. 
 60. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 91, at 148 (4th ed. 1890) (“The rule of strict construction of corporate 
powers is . . . applicable to grants of powers to municipal and public bodies 
which are out of the usual range, or which may result in public burdens, or 
which, in their exercise, touch the right to liberty or property or, as it may be 
compendiously expressed, any common-law right of the citizen or inhabitant.”). 
 61. Barron, supra note 34, at 2294–95. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.; see also JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY GOV-
ERNMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1900, at 116–22 (1984) (discussing the difficulties 
of home rule cities in nineteenth century Missouri and California in structuring 
their own governments, a quintessential homerule function, in light of state su-
preme court rulings that limited the powers of state legislatures). 
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did little to stop a court from rubber-stamping that assertion of 
power as sufficiently local if it felt like doing so.64 However, when 
considering the underlying motivations behind these traditional 
conceptions of home rule, there are, at minimum, certain areas 
that could be considered definitively beyond local government 
concern. In his expansive treatise, The Law and the Practice of 
Municipal Home Rule,65 Howard Lee McBain demarcates nine 
areas that he considered well outside the scope of a home rule 
city’s authority: 
The [subject matters] that have given rise to this problem are those 
that are commonly dealt with in charters of legislative origin. No city 
has ever attempted to draw unto itself the complete powers of the state. 
By common understanding such general subjects as . . . domestic rela-
tions, wills and administration, mortgages, trusts, contracts, real and 
personal property, insurance, banking, corporations, and many others 
have never been regarded by any one, least of all by the cities them-
selves, as appropriate subjects of local control. No city has been so fool-
hardy as to venture generally into any one of these fields of law. It has 
simply been universally accepted that these matters are strictly of 
“state concern.”66 
The thrust of McBain’s treatise was to argue for a more logical 
and clear understanding of home rule power.67 Later commenta-
tors have referred to this list of areas of law that cities would be 
“foolhardy” to explore as the McBain Nine, or the private law 
exception.68 And while McBain himself was not necessarily a 
conservative home ruler, his matter-of-fact dismissal of these ar-
eas as of “strictly ‘state concern’” speaks to a common belief 
among conservative urban reformers: home rule should limit city 
power as much as it expanded it. In attempting to articulate why 
exceptions like the McBain Nine are “appropriate and even nec-
 
 64. Barron, supra note 34, at 2294–95. The Supreme Court’s struggle, or 
even disinterest, in Hunter to clearly define the public versus private nature of 
municipal corporations further demonstrates the difficulty of drawing clear 
lines between areas of law that belong to one area of government over another. 
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
 65. HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL 
HOME RULE (1916). 
 66. Id. at 673 (emphasis added). 
 67. See id. at vii (“No constitutional provision granting home rule powers 
should be drafted without an accurate and detailed knowledge of the origin and 
nature of [home rule’s ambiguities]. It is unjust that the courts should be com-
pelled to give precise definition to terms which have no precision of meaning 
and be forced to determine complicated questions of public policy which the 
framers of constitutions have either lightly ignored or deliberately dodged.”). 
 68. Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Excep-
tion, 20 UCLA L. REV. 671, 690 (1973). 
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essary,” scholars have examined areas of law that are “ineffi-
cient” in application at the municipal level.69 Because the suc-
cess of certain areas of law depend upon uniformity and minimal 
burdens upon state schemes of administration, the traditional 
view of home rule favored city power that did not interfere, or 
have the potential to interfere, with state-level schemes that 
could be applied evenly.70 Local concern, then, was limited to ar-
eas that did not depend upon such uniformity. This view in-
formed the construction of home rule charters that focused on 
extending city power only to those areas that state legislatures 
could not manage at a general level. 
b. The Progressive Approach 
Unlike the traditional perspective, the progressive reform-
ers comprised a broader spectrum of opinions regarding how cit-
ies best fit into a relationship with their parent states.71 The one 
area on which they were unified, however, was their disapproval 
of the state creature model.72 Despite the varying beliefs regard-
ing what a city could or should be in a growing urban America,73 
the home rule amendments that came out of these progressive 
approaches nevertheless demonstrated the belief in preserving 
separate spheres of municipal power in order for local concern to 
encompass new challenges. 
One such progressive approach to home rule was what Da-
vid J. Barron has coined the administrative city.74 Under this 
perspective, cities needed to be protected from state interference, 
but not because of the fear that such usurpation would divert 
cities from their traditional functions. Rather, progressive re-
formers like Frank J. Goodnow believed that modern cities 
 
 69. See id. at 753 (“If the conclusion thus is that undue burden and extreme 
inefficiency do function as predicates for home rule exceptions, it is important 
to note that the private law component of a city ordinance will often significantly 
add to the overall magnitude of its burden or the extent of its inefficiency.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Barron, supra note 34, at 2300–20. Barron distinguishes between 
those who saw cities as administrative tools through which local technocrats 
could implement local policies, and still more progressive reformers, who saw 
the city as being truly political bodies and capable of functioning as self-suffi-
cient governmental bodies. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 2323; see also JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE PO-
LITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 1850–1970, at 8 (1979) 
(discussing the correlation between liberalized incorporation laws and the in-
crease in new municipalities). 
 74. See Barron, supra note 34, at 2300. 
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needed to be nimble enough to face challenges that the tradi-
tional model of city-state sovereignty was too rigid to regulate.75 
Part of this shifting attitude was a practical understanding that 
the “accelerating interdependence of a nationalizing industrial 
economy” required cities to embrace new definitions of local con-
cern that the “anachronistic” traditional model did not contem-
plate.76 The other motivating factor was the growing belief that 
the “larger social realm beyond one’s private life” that existed in 
modern cities required them to function as more than “facilita-
tors” of private property interests.77 For Goodnow and other pro-
gressives, the solution was to push for a home rule that allowed 
cities to function with broad police powers, without having to 
juggle the competing interests of state politics.78 Doing so would 
allow technical experts, rather than political interests, to oper-
ate local governments as quasi-private administrative agen-
cies.79 
Other progressive reformers felt that cities should oppose 
the traditional “culture of privatism” through “collective ac-
tion.”80 This view, which Barron terms the social city approach, 
placed value in city power that was “public and political, rather 
than quasi-private or administrative.”81 Much like Goodnow, 
these progressives believed that home rule was critical for pre-
serving city power from state interference. Unlike Goodnow, 
however, these reformers hoped that home rule could be used not 
for “administration all the way down,”82 but rather to unleash a 
political “city sense” that “would attract to its service big, far-
sighted men no longer willing to leave urban politics to the petty 
grafters and bosses.”83 Thus, the social goals of a city should be 
protected under home rule because of the unrealized potential 
 
 75. See id. at 2301. 
 76. Michael H. Frisch, Urban Theorists, Urban Reform, and American Po-
litical Culture in the Progressive Period, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 295, 307 (1982). 
 77. Barron, supra note 34, at 2301. 
 78. See id. at 2301–02. 
 79. This view of the city as administrative agency was a popular progres-
sive belief at that time. See FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 
84 (1914) (“[M]unicipal government is very largely a matter of administration 
in the narrow sense of the word. This is the truth at the bottom of the claim 
which is so often made, that municipal government is a matter of business.”). 
 80. Barron, supra note 34, at 2309. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. at 2308. 
 83. DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PRO-
GRESSIVE AGE 141 (1998). 
 440 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:427 
 
cities had to implement useful change, even beyond the admin-
istrative managing model that Goodnow had envisioned. 
Both of these views were bold departures from the tradi-
tional state creature model of cities contemplated by Dillon’s 
Rule and Hunter. Regardless of motive, progressive home rulers 
hoped to create amendments that would empower cities to play 
important roles, wholly separate from the state agenda. To be 
sure, there was still a belief that cities should be limited in their 
capacities, either because the administrative city was too “scien-
tific” to safely harbor notions of “local autonomy,”84 or because 
such limits were “necessary preconditions for the city’s realiza-
tion of its full potential as a social institution.”85 But even with-
out strong convictions for “local autonomy for its own sake,” 
these visions of home rule gave states rationales to create provi-
sions that expanded the understanding of local concern beyond 
what Dillon had ever contemplated. In the progressive home rule 
view, the collective understanding of what constituted local con-
cern needed to be flexible to meet the evolving needs of cities, as 
well as protected from state interference in order to ensure that 
those needs could be met uninhibited.86 Ultimately, both the tra-
ditional and progressive perspectives inform the reach of home 
rule. The motivations that led to the plain language of these 
amendments can also provide courts with proper context to ei-
ther uphold new municipal efforts as necessary expansion, or to 
strike them down as beyond the scope of local concern. 
2. Home Rule Initiative 
The home rule movement was primarily concerned with two 
objectives: (1) imbuing local governments with spheres of power 
in which they could “operate under a general grant of authority 
from the state”; and (2) giving cities “an area of autonomy im-
mune from state control, even by general legislation.”87 The sec-
ond aspect of this concern is often referred to as home rule im-
munity,88 and is the primary concern of this Note. It is 
nevertheless important to understand the mechanics of the other 
half, or home rule initiative, first. 
 
 84. See Frisch, supra note 76 (describing the danger proponents of the ad-
ministrative city saw in “[d]elusions of autonomy” that “could only produce a 
net loss in civic capacity, putting effective power into the hands of a local busi-
ness elite or the state legislature, and most likely both in corrupt tandem”). 
 85. Barron, supra note 34, at 2311. 
 86. See id. at 2310–21. 
 87. FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 174. 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 174–75. 
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a. Defining the Scope of Home Rule Initiative 
Home rule initiative became the chosen solution to the con-
straints placed on cities after Hunter. Constitutional amend-
ments providing for the formation of city governments allowed 
localities to pass their own laws without seeking express permis-
sion from their parent states every time a new ordinance needed 
to be passed. For example, the Arizona Constitution allows 
“[a]ny city containing, now or hereafter, a population of more 
than three thousand five hundred” to “frame a charter for its own 
government consistent with, and subject to, the Constitution and 
the laws of the state.”89 Courts in Arizona have even interpreted 
the ability of a city to “frame a charter for its own government” 
as conferring positive powers of local authority that “render the 
cities adopting such charter provisions as nearly independent of 
state legislation as . . . possible.”90 Even without grants of au-
thority as broad as Arizona, home rule states that allowed cities 
of a certain size to pass charters created at least a limited level 
of local autonomy.91 Typically, the only outer limit of such grants 
is that they be of local or municipal concern, the “source of city 
power . . . depend[ing] in many cases on the particular terms of 
the home rule grant or on judicial determinations concerning the 
kinds of actions that are properly understood to concern ‘local’ or 
‘municipal’ affairs.”92 Once this initiative power has been im-
bued into a state’s constitution, state courts become important 
tools in defining not only its limits, but the existence of other 
implied negative powers often not fully articulated in the consti-
tutional text. 
b. The Role of the Courts in Shaping Home Rule 
As discussed further in Parts II and III, courts also play an 
important role in defining the boundary between local authority 
 
 89. ARIZ. CONST. art. 13, § 2. 
 90. City of Tucson v. Walker, 135 P.2d 223, 226 (Ariz. 1943) (quoting Ax-
berg v. City of Lincoln, 2 N.W.2d 613, 614 (Neb. 1942)). 
 91. But see Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (“[A state] at 
its pleasure may modify or withdraw all [of a city’s] powers, may take without 
compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand 
or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another mu-
nicipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, 
conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or 
even against their protest.”). The significance of this language, and whether it 
may simply obfuscate any hope for home rule immunity, is discussed in Part 
III.D, infra. 
 92. FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 176. 
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and state policy.93 In ruling on cases involving home rule initia-
tives, a court’s holding on the constitutionality of a particular 
ordinance will often boil down to whether that local law has ex-
ceeded the scope of a local concern or otherwise interferes with a 
state-created legal scheme.94 Many commentators argue that 
this archetypal framework can lead to broader home rule provi-
sions that eschew the state versus local distinction, which can 
ironically hamper a city’s ability to pass its own legislation.95 If 
a city has a grant to “exercise any legislative power or perform 
any function” of a state legislature, for example, the capacity of 
a court to intervene and interpret what powers constitute local 
or municipal concern may be severely limited, leaving the scope 
of local power to be fully defined through state legislative action 
(or lack thereof).96 
The tension courts often face in defining the boundary be-
tween state and local power was on full display in McCrory Corp. 
v. Fowler.97 In that case, a Maryland county ordinance creating 
a private cause of action for employment discrimination was 
found to exceed the county’s home rule authority.98 Maryland’s 
constitution, which grants to all of its counties “full power to en-
act local laws . . . upon all matters covered by the express powers 
granted as above provided,” effectively barred the creation of a 
new private cause of action at the county level in the area of em-
ployment discrimination.99 The McCrory court reasoned that 
this area of law, “which heretofore had been the province of state 
agencies,” was too far beyond the scope of the county’s home rule 
 
 93. See infra Part II.B.2., Part III. 
 94. See, e.g., Order Dismissing Petition at 5–10, Bicking v. City of Minne-
apolis, No. 27-CV-16-11839 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016). 
 95. FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 176. 
 96. There is a considerable amount of disagreement on the extent to which 
a broad or narrow conception of home rule matters more for local government 
power. Some proponents of narrow home rule provisions argue that well-defined 
categories of local authority give courts the freedom to permit important powers 
at a local level, while holding in check municipal legislative actions that 
threaten statewide policies. See Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal 
Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964). 
Meanwhile, other commentators point out that express limitations on local is-
sues can just as easily allow courts to deem issues of pressing societal need out-
side the scope of local concern, creating an easy out from further consideration 
of whether certain areas of law are, or need to be, legislated at a state level. See 
Barron, supra note 34, at 2349–50. 
 97. McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 570 A.2d 834 (Md. 1990). 
 98. Id. at 834–35. 
 99. Id. at 836. 
 2017] CITY–STATE PREEMPTION 443 
 
initiative to be deemed constitutional.100 The next question is 
then whether, just as the municipality interfered with protected 
state powers in McCrory, states can be deemed to have gone too 
far in their intrusion on protected municipal matters. 
3. Home Rule Immunity 
Embedded within the limiting of city power to local issues is 
the possibility that, while cities cannot exceed the outer limits of 
such authority, states similarly cannot impinge on a city’s ability 
to remain autonomous in areas that are truly local in nature. 
The implied negative power of home rule amendments is a limit 
on state control over local affairs that many have identified as 
home rule immunity.101 Frug et al. describe a basic dichotomy in 
understanding home rule immunity: (1) immunity in the face of 
interference in areas where cities more likely do not have ple-
nary initiative power from a state government; and (2) immunity 
in the face of interference in areas where they do have authority 
from state governments to enact such provisions.102 The authors 
use this basic categorization in order to demonstrate that home 
rule immunity, “to the extent it exists at all, depends on state 
law.”103 Pushing the boundaries of home rule immunity, then, 
depends on how judicial interpretations of it vary across differ-
ent categories of local concern, whether a court’s conception of 
local is flexible, and the extent to which state law has previously 
attempted to regulate those areas. 
Some judicial interpretations of home rule immunity are 
made in a context under which a city may not have had plenary 
authority to enact legislation in the first place. In New Orleans 
Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, the New 
Orleans city council placed a provision to establish a minimum 
wage by amending the city charter on the ballot.104 The charter 
amendment was adopted, then was swiftly followed by a declar-
atory judgment proceeding on (1) the validity of the amendment; 
 
 100. Id. at 838. 
 101. See, e.g., William R. Andersen, Resolving State/Local Governmental 
Conflict—A Tale of Three Cities, 18 URB. L. ANN. 129, 131 (1980). 
 102. FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 198. 
 103. Id. 
 104. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 
So. 2d 1098, 1101–03 (La. 2002) (quoting Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 
So. 2d 1, 14 (La. 2001)) (“[I]n affairs of local concern, a home rule charter gov-
ernment possesses ‘powers which within its jurisdiction are as broad as that of 
the state, except when limited by the constitution, laws permitted by the con-
stitution, or its own home rule charter.’”). 
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and (2) the unconstitutionality of a prior Louisiana state law 
that “prohibit[ed] local governmental subdivisions from estab-
lishing a minimum wage.”105 The Supreme Court of Louisiana 
ruled that the charter amendment violated state law.106 While 
recognizing that “Article VI [of the Louisiana Constitution] pro-
tects home rule governments from unwarranted interference by 
the state in their internal affairs” through the requirement that 
local control only be revoked or changed by a “reasonable exer-
cise of the state’s police power,” the state law at issue here was 
clearly intended to do just that.107 The state law, the Living 
Wage court held, had been passed based on reasonable policy 
findings that issues of wages were a statewide issue, and thus 
the prohibition against passing parallel ordinances at the local 
level did not infringe on the power of immunity granted to Loui-
siana municipalities.108 While acknowledging the existence of 
home rule immunity, the court seemed to place an emphasis on 
whether an arguably local issue overlapped with a previously es-
tablished statewide concern, even in attempting to regulate that 
concern on a small scale.109 
Juxtaposed against these cases are instances where a state 
legislature attempts to revoke or alter a municipality’s power 
where it may already have been granted. In City of Tucson v. 
State, the Arizona legislature amended state law to alter the pro-
cess by which city council members in cities could be elected.110 
The city brought suit, citing the home rule provision of the Ari-
zona Constitution. That amendment gave eligible cities the abil-
ity to adopt charters, and the power to “frame its own organic 
law, including the power to determine ‘who shall be its governing 
officers and how they shall be selected.’”111 The Supreme Court 
of Arizona ruled in the city’s favor. Despite a state legislative 
finding that “the conduct of elections . . . is a matter of statewide 
concern,” the City of Tucson court reasoned that Arizona’s home 
 
 105. Id. at 1101. 
 106. Id. at 1108. 
 107. Id. at 1103–07. 
 108. See id. at 1108. 
 109. See id.; see also Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d 
30, 39 (Colo. 2000) (finding that the issue of local rent control “[is] not so dis-
cretely local that all state interests are superseded,” thus invalidating the local 
ordinance where it conflicted with broader state policy). 
 110. City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624 (Ariz. 2012). 
 111. Id. at 625 (quoting Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d 48, 54 (Ariz. 1951)). 
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rule provisions were clearly intended, at least in the area of local 
elections, to insulate home rule cities from state interference.112 
These cases paint a picture of home rule immunity that is 
dependent on: (1) the permissiveness of the home rule language; 
and (2) the extent to which the state has staked out a legitimate 
interest in the area of law. Some home rule amendments allow 
cities to perform the same functions of a state “unless [striking 
down the ordinance] is necessary to prevent an abridgement of 
the reasonable exercise of the state’s police power,”113 while oth-
ers leave the determination as to what activity is state or local 
in nature open to court interpretation.114 But even in states 
where cities do not have the power to enact laws with the same 
functional power as the state, the factors mentioned above allow 
courts to carve out some exceptions whereby municipal govern-
ments are protected from state interference. The decision in Liv-
ing Wage is a prime example of this power. The court’s determi-
nation turned, at least in part, on the reasonableness of the 
state’s prohibitive measure;115 without a well-grounded ra-
tionale on which to deem the minimum wage law a matter of 
statewide concern, it is unlikely that the measure would have 
been able to penetrate the otherwise broad leeway that court 
gave to its home rule amendment. In the current climate of city-
state relations, then, a showing of a lack of an actual state inter-
est in the face of a preemptive law may well be the line past 
which a state may not intrude on local governance, provided 
home rule exists to validate a recognition of local power. 
II.  THE NEED FOR HOME RULE IMMUNITY WHEN 
STATE GOVERNMENTS ABANDON THE FIELD   
As discussed in Part I, home rule may only be a practical 
tool to the extent it: (1) is sufficient in scope to allow cities to act 
upon granted powers; and (2) protects cities from state interfer-
ence, depending on courts’ interpretations of issues that are suf-
ficiently local.116 
 
 112. See id. at 630–32. 
 113. Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1103 (quoting Morial v. Smith & Wesson 
Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 14 (La. 2001)). 
 114. See COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6; Town of Telluride 3 P.3d at 37. 
 115. See Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1103 (quoting Smith & Wesson Corp., 
785 So. 2d at 14) (“Article VI also serves to foster local self-government by al-
lowing home rule entities to utilize their powers and functions on the local level 
without revocation, change, or affect by law unless it is necessary to prevent an 
abridgement of the reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.”). 
 116. See supra Part I. 
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Traditionally, states can challenge these powers when legis-
lating programs that have a statewide impact, or when a city 
ordinance is otherwise in direct conflict with state law.117 This 
Part explores the impact of home rule immunity on situations 
where state legislatures have either neglected or chosen not to 
address a particular area that localities deem worthy of new leg-
islation. Section A defines this situation as abandoning the field, 
and discusses the difference between active and passive aban-
donment. Part B looks at three examples of home rule amend-
ments (or their equivalents) to see how courts can reframe the 
reach of local power in the face of this abandonment. Ultimately, 
this Part proposes that when states abandon a particular area of 
law, courts are more likely to look at a variety of factors to find 
justification for ruling in favor of a city’s attempt to fill a legisla-
tive void. 
A. DEFINING ABANDONING THE FIELD 
The energy benchmarking legislation in Arizona discussed 
above fashions a unique brand of preemption.118 First, it explic-
itly prohibits any city or town from “requir[ing] an owner, oper-
ator or tenant of a business, commercial building or multifamily 
housing property to measure and report energy usage and con-
sumption, including energy consumption benchmarking and 
building facility energy efficiency audits.”119 Second, and more 
notably, it does not purport to actively preempt any of these 
banned practices with any legislation of its own; while it techni-
cally preempts local ordinances in a literal sense, it does not re-
place local ordinances with any functional policy in that field of 
law.120 The legislation essentially tells cities and counties that 
they are forbidden from acting in an area that the state considers 
 
 117. See FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 218. 
 118. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 119. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.36 (2016). 
 120. See id. (prohibiting cities from passing energy benchmarking bills at 
the municipal level without proposing any additional legislative measures that 
actually “preempt” such ordinances). The same bill also was meant to block cit-
ies from passing ordinances that would impose taxes, fees, or deposits on local 
businesses that use disposable bags. This was similarly passed in response to 
cities like Tucson, Flagstaff, and Tempe that were considering such measures. 
See Howard Fischer, PLASTIC BAGS: Plastic Bag Preemption Enacted, ARIZ. 
DAILY SUN (MAR. 15, 2016), http://azdailysun.com/news/local/plastic-bag-
preemption-enacted/article_e2146ff3-c4cf-5f79-8fc6-9c5b2a67949a.html. 
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“particularly sensitive,”121 without proposing any alternative 
scheme to regulate that area. 
Legislation like the energy benchmarking bill that forbids 
cities from passing certain ordinances without actively preempt-
ing them with any replacement legislation is one way a state can 
actively abandon a field of law. Unlike examples of state preemp-
tion where courts determine that a state legislature has occupied 
the field by passing their own general laws that impact all of its 
political subdivisions,122 this unique brand of preemption simply 
prohibits a city from acting without actually addressing the ex-
tent to which it is a statewide concern. In states like Arizona, 
this active abandonment of a field may occur after and even in 
reaction to a city ordinance, thus attempting to unwind local leg-
islation in a targeted fashion not unlike the special legislation of 
the pre-home rule movement.123 
Other, less overt examples of state inaction still raise simi-
lar questions regarding the limits of city-state preemption. It 
may be the case that a city is simply acting ahead of a state on a 
certain issue, and legal challenges arise as to whether such ac-
tion exceeds the scope of a home rule amendment. In Minnesota, 
for example, a recent suit challenging a referendum to amend 
the Minneapolis charter and raise the local minimum wage cen-
tered on whether the issue was simply permissible as a home 
rule charter amendment, not whether it conflicted with state 
minimum wage laws.124 While the issues in Minnesota do not 
involve outright prohibitions of local legislation, cities (or, in this 
case, citizens of cities) may nevertheless become unsure of how 
to bridge a legislative void on issues that can have a significant 
impact at the local level. 
 
 121. H.B. 2130, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2016). The bill’s session law ex-
plains that the decision to prohibit municipal ordinances regarding energy 
benchmarking is based on the conclusion “that small businesses are particularly 
sensitive to costs and expenses incurred in complying with regulatory actions of 
a city [or] town.” 
 122. See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 820 (Cal. 
2005) (finding that an ordinance regulating predatory lending practices was 
preempted because a prior state law “impliedly fully occupied the field of regu-
lation . . . and hence the Ordinance is preempted on this ground”). 
 123. See supra Part I.C. 
 124. See Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467, 469 (Minn. 2016) 
(per curiam) (framing the city’s argument against the minimum wage referen-
dum as an issue of the permissive language of the state’s home rule amendment, 
not as whether the state had passed a statute directly in conflict with the meas-
ure). 
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Both of these contexts are quite different from cases like Liv-
ing Wage.125 While the exercise of home rule power in that case 
was struck down because the state legislature had made deter-
minations that employment issues should be governed at the 
state level,126 here, cities are attempting to pass ordinances in a 
legislative vacuum and being challenged on similar grounds. 
Such challenges are flawed assertions of preemption, however, 
because they ignore previously recognized spheres of power that 
should be allowed to adapt to an evolving city-state relationship. 
As argued in Part III, this type of preemption should be recon-
sidered, because it restricts local power based on technical stat-
utory construction rather than a practical understanding of 
where home rule should start and end.127 When attempts to pass 
new local legislation demonstrate that potential conflicts at the 
state level do not serve a legitimate state purpose, courts should 
be more willing to recognize that a city’s home rule immunity 
powers should outweigh considerations of the state creature 
model.128 
B. CASE STUDIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LEGISLATING IN 
ABANDONED FIELDS 
Cities in states with varying degrees of home rule protec-
tions have recently faced challenges to their abilities to legislate 
on local issues. This Section examines these situations in turn, 
and evaluates the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of 
these cities’ delegated powers. In so doing, it frames the difficul-
ties each locality faces in passing laws on issues that their re-
spective states will not act on, in order to provide context to the 
possible solutions outlined in Part III.129 
 
 125. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 
So. 2d 1098 (La. 2002). 
 126. Id. at 1106 (concluding that “[i]n enacting La. R.S. 23:642, the [state] 
legislature determined the policy of the State of Louisiana with respect to min-
imum wage requirements”). 
 127. See infra Part III.D. 
 128. But cf. Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 
2016 BYU L. REV. 177, 253–60 (2016). Stahl argues that current conceptions of 
home rule are outdated and that new models that reject the traditional notions 
of liberalism are needed to make meaningful change in a globalizing economy. 
This Note argues within the framework of traditional conceptions of home rule, 
and argues that these models are flexible enough to allow courts to make mean-
ingful determinations over whether a local government should be granted power 
to act legislatively. 
 129. Infra Part III. 
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1. North Carolina 
On February 22, 2016, the Charlotte City Council passed 
Ordinance No. 7056 in a seven to four vote.130 The legislation 
was designed as a broad prohibition against discrimination 
based on, among other immutable characteristics, sexual orien-
tation and gender identity.131 The ordinance specifically tar-
geted discrimination in the use of public accommodations, as 
well as in city contracting and the use of for-hire vehicles.132 
Just one month later, the North Carolina General Assembly 
convened a special legislative session specifically to pass the 
Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, known more colloqui-
ally as HB2 or the bathroom bill (hereinafter HB2).133 The legis-
lation specifically targeted Ordinance No. 7056’s anti-discrimi-
natory measures relating to public accommodations by 
specifically requiring any “multiple occupancy bathroom or 
changing facility [to] be designated for and only used by persons 
based on their biological sex.”134 The bill also included preemp-
tive language, declaring that the provision “supersede[s] and 
preempt[s] any ordinance, regulation, resolution, or policy 
adopted or imposed by a unit of local government or other polit-
ical subdivision of the State that regulates or imposes any re-
quirement pertaining to the regulation of discriminatory prac-
tices in places of public accommodation.”135 
The reaction to HB2 was largely negative, both commer-
cially136 and politically.137 The mounting criticism that the law 
 
 130. See Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 (Feb. 22, 2016); Harrison, supra 
note 9. 
 131. See Harrison, supra note 9. 
 132. See id. 
 133. 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 2016-3. 
 134. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-521.2 (West 2016). 
 135. Id. § 143-422.11. 
 136. See, e.g., Alex Kotch, North Carolina’s Anti-LGBT Law Has Cost the 
State More Than $560 Million So Far, INST. FOR SOUTHERN STUD.: FACING 
SOUTH (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.facingsouth.org/2017/01/north-carolinas 
-anti-lgbt-law-has-cost-state-more-560-million-so-far (detailing the companies 
that refused to do business in the state as a result of the law’s social policies). 
Some researchers estimated that the consequences could have been even more 
dire when the bill was first passed. See Katherine Peralta, House Bill 2 Could 
Cost N.C. $5 Billion a Year, Report Says, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 11, 2016), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/article76997927.html. 
 137. See, e.g., Hundreds Protest HB2 in Downtown Raleigh, ABC 11 EYEWIT-
NESS NEWS (Apr. 8, 2016), http://abc11.com/politics/hundreds-protest-hb2-in 
-downtown-raleigh/1273762; Sarah Krueger, More Than 700 People Attend 
Anti-House Bill 2 Rally in Greensboro, FOX 8 (Apr. 3, 2016), http://myfox8.com/ 
2016/04/03/more-than-700-people-attend-anti-house-bill-2-rally-in-greensboro; 
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constituted “blatant discrimination” that “ma[de] it public policy 
to harass, bully, humiliate, target, and punish LGBT people,”138 
and the resulting commercial consequences of that criticism, 
eventually led to a repeal of HB2.139 On March 30, 2017, the 
North Carolina legislature passed a revised public accommoda-
tion bill, House Bill 142 (hereinafter HB142).140 HB142 repealed 
HB2 in its entirety, but, in a compromise with advocates of the 
2016 bill, enacted two significant preemptive measures. First, 
HB142 explicitly prohibits “[s]tate agencies, boards, offices, de-
partments, institutions, branches of government, . . . and politi-
cal subdivisions of the State” from regulating access to public fa-
cilities, including restrooms.141 Second, it prohibits all local 
governments from enacting or amending any ordinances “regu-
lating private employment practices or regulating public accom-
modations.”142 
Ultimately, while the state has rolled back the explicit tar-
geting of HB2 toward LGBT citizens, the preemptive spirit of 
that law has been maintained in HB142. Meanwhile, the legal 
challenges to HB2 when it was enacted focused mostly on alle-
gations that the restrictions on public accommodations based on 
gender identity violated the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the United States Constitution.143 There was never 
pushback from the local level as to whether HB2 impermissibly 
violated state law governing the city-state relationship.144 
 
Bill O’Neil, Petitions Filed to Repeal HB2, WXII NEWS (Apr. 25, 2016), http:// 
www.wxii12.com/article/petitions-filed-to-repeal-hb2/1932259. 
 138. Repeal North Carolina’s Anti-LGBT Law, ACLU ACTION (Apr. 24, 
2016), https://action.aclu.org/secure/NC-repeal-HB2. 
 139. See Richard Fausset, North Carolina Strikes a Deal to Repeal Restric-
tive Bathroom Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
03/29/us/north-carolina-lawmakers-reach-deal-to-repeal-so-called 
-bathroom-bill.html. 
 140. 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 2017-4. 
 141. Id. (emphasis added). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Carcaño v. 
McCrory, No. 1:16-cv-236, 2016 WL 1213004, at *33–38 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 
2016). 
 144. HB142 was passed just prior to the completion of this Note. Legal chal-
lenges to the new bill, which have already been intimated in correspondence 
from opponents of the statute, may invoke interference with local initiative 
power, in addition to the equal protection arguments raised against HB2. See 
Letter from Sarah M. Gillooly, Policy Dir., ACLU, to Roy Cooper, Governor of 
N.C. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/letter/letter-governor-cooper 
-requesting-veto-hb-142. 
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North Carolina is not a home rule state per se.145 It has, 
however, passed broad statutory grants of initiative authority 
that contain three important characteristics. First, sec-
tion 160A-4 of the state code provides that “cities of this State 
should have adequate authority to execute the powers, duties, 
privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law.”146 The 
statute concludes that the provisions of this power-granting stat-
ute and that of city charters “shall be broadly construed . . . to 
include any additional and supplementary powers that are rea-
sonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and 
effect,” so long as they are “not . . . contrary to State or federal 
law or to the public policy of this State.”147 Second, another pro-
vision of the same section of the state code grants broad and gen-
eral regulatory authority: “[a] city may by ordinance define, pro-
hibit, regulate, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions, 
detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and 
the peace and dignity of the city, and may define and abate nui-
sances.”148 It further requires that such ordinances “be con-
sistent with the Constitution and laws of North Carolina and of 
the United States,” but otherwise does not contain any particu-
lar limitations.149 However, other more specific state statutes 
outline various areas where cities and counties may or may not 
pass local legislation. While some laws grant the regulation of 
firearm use150 and “sexually oriented businesses,” within city 
limits,151 others place limits on certain administrative functions, 
including property disposal152 and voting procedures of local gov-
erning bodies.153 Finally, the North Carolina Constitution con-
tains no prohibition against special legislation.154 Without this 
restriction, a local government may request a special local law 
from the state legislature to extend powers not yet conferred to 
new areas, so long as such ordinances do not otherwise violate 
state law.155 
 
 145. Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need Home 
Rule?, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1983, 1985 (2006). 
 146. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-4 (West 2016). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. § 160A-174. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. § 160A-189. 
 151. Id. § 160A-181.1. 
 152. See Id. § 160A, art. 12. 
 153. Id. § 160A-75. 
 154. See generally N.C. CONST. (failing to prohibit special legislation). 
 155. See Bluestein, supra note 145, at 2006. 
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North Carolina’s statutory structure establishes a compli-
cated delegation of local authority between cities and states 
based on a laundry list of specific grants and prohibitions of ini-
tiative power.156 Because the state constitution does not contain 
a home rule amendment, courts have instead focused their anal-
ysis of this relationship on the extent to which the principles of 
Dillon’s Rule apply in the state. While courts have intermittently 
applied Dillon’s Rule to cases where local ordinances have been 
challenged, the landmark decision of Homebuilder’s Ass’n of 
Charlotte v. City of Charlotte pushed back on the prevalence of 
Dillon’s Rule.157 That case, which centered on whether Charlotte 
could impose fees in connection with regulatory services and use 
of public facilities, held that a statutory regime allowing for city 
powers to be “broadly construed” should usurp narrower delega-
tions of authority based on Dillon’s Rule and Hunter.158 
Since the decision in Homebuilder’s Ass’n, Dillon’s Rule con-
tinues to be invoked in North Carolina, but typically only in sit-
uations “where the plain meaning of the statute is without am-
biguity.”159 In BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of 
Laurinburg, the state appellate court applied the rationale of 
Homebuilder’s Ass’n to conclude that the statutory grant of au-
thority applied in situations of “extending powers to a munici-
pality where there is an ambiguity in the authorizing language, 
or the powers clearly authorized reasonably necessitate ‘addi-
tional and supplementary powers’ ‘to carry them into execution 
and effect.’”160 If the statute and its grant of authority were not 
ambiguous, the BellSouth court concluded, application of the 
narrow grants under Dillon’s Rule was more appropriate.161 
North Carolina, therefore, seems to sit somewhere between 
a home rule state and one that is purely beholden to the state 
creature model, at least when it is unclear whether the state has 
clearly limited its authority. In situations where cities wish to 
pass new legislation for issues that may have a local impact, 
 
 156. See id. at 2000–12. 
 157. Homebuilder ’s Ass’n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45 
(N.C. 1994). 
 158. See id. at 50 (finding it “unnecessary to decide” the question of whether 
application of Dillon’s Rule was necessary to decide the “proper rule of construc-
tion” because section 160A-4 was more relevant). 
 159. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Laurinburg, 606 S.E.2d 721, 726 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 160. Id. (quoting Homebuilders Ass’n, 442 S.E.2d at 50). 
 161. See id. 
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such as Ordinance No. 7056, courts are likely to focus on the ex-
istence of limiting language in state law. Without a home rule 
amendment to provide immunity from interference from the 
state level, however, even broad statutory grants of authority 
may not provide sufficient space in which cities can operate, de-
spite retaliatory preemption at the state level. 
2. Minnesota 
Unlike North Carolina, Minnesota is a home rule state; the 
Minnesota Constitution provides that “[a]ny local government 
unit when authorized by law may adopt a home rule charter for 
its government.”162 Nevertheless, the ability to locally legislate 
in an abandoned field has faced recent challenges. In 2016, two 
advocacy groups obtained enough signatures to place two pro-
posed amendments to the Minneapolis City Charter on an up-
coming ballot: one that would have, over a course of years, in-
creased the minimum wage to fifteen dollars an hour;163 and one 
that would have required all police officers in the city to carry 
their own personal liability insurance.164 When the Minneapolis 
City Council voted against including the provisions on the ballot, 
the advocacy groups sued in state court, arguing that blocking 
the measures from reaching a vote constituted “error[s] with re-
gard to the preparation of a ballot.”165 Ultimately, both of these 
challenges failed.166 Ignoring the plaintiff ’s challenge to the vote 
itself, the state district court ruled in Bicking v. City of Minne-
apolis that state law preempted the proposed ballot measure re-
garding police liability insurance, because the state had already 
passed “extensive regulation” regarding “the city’s obligation to 
completely indemnify” its police officers, thus prohibiting a con-
flicting requirement that officers also carry their own insur-
ance.167 
 
 162. MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 4. 
 163. See Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467, 468 (Minn. 2016) 
(per curiam). 
 164. Order Dismissing Petition at 3, Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, No. 27-
CV-16-11839 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 2; Vasseur, 887 N.W.2d at 474. Ironically, the city of Minne-
apolis was the challenging party in both cases. But, as discussed infra, these 
decisions ultimately did not curb the city’s ability to pass their own ordinances 
on these issues because of Minnesota’s strong home rule protections. 
 167. Order Dismissing Petition at 5–10, Bicking, No. 27-CV-16-11839 (Dist. 
Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016). 
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The minimum wage proposal was also defeated, in the case 
Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that the language of the Minneapolis Charter placed “gen-
eral legislative authority” squarely within the province of the 
City Council, and prohibited passing of legislative acts through 
referenda.168 Eschewing a discussion of whether the proposed 
referendum fell within the permissible range of subject matters 
that could be incorporated into local legislation,169 the court held 
that the wage amendment, by effectively allowing normal citi-
zens to pass legislative acts rather than the City Council, would 
“conflict[] with the permissible form of government adopted in 
the Minneapolis City Charter.”170 This conclusion was based on 
section 1.4(a) of the Minneapolis charter, which allows the city 
“through the boards, commissions, committees, departments, 
and officers” to “exercise any power that a municipal corporation 
can lawfully exercise at common law.”171 
While neither of the attempts at grassroots local legislation 
in Bicking and Vasseur were successful,172 the decisions both ex-
plore the limits of home rule in Minnesota. First, the district 
court ruling in Bicking demonstrates the extent to which a 
state’s intent to preempt city ordinances in a particular area of 
law overrides concerns of whether a particular issue is suffi-
ciently local. Indeed, the district court found that: (1) state law 
was intended to occupy the field of tort liability at the municipal 
level through language that claimed that the relevant statutes 
were “exclusive of and supersede[d] all home rule charter provi-
sions . . . on the same subject heretofore and hereafter adopted”; 
and (2) the proposed charter amendment directly conflicted with 
 
 168. Vasseur, 887 N.W.2d at 471. 
 169. See id. at 473 (concluding that the court “d[id] not need to define the 
precise meaning of the phrase ‘local municipal functions’” within the meaning 
of the state’s statute regarding acceptable subject matter for home rule char-
ters). 
 170. Id. at 471. 
 171. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CITY CHARTER § 1.4(a) (2017). The court also 
noted in its decision that section 4.1(a) of the charter grants the City Council 
the “City’s general legislative and policymaking authority.” See Vasseur, 887 
N.W.2d at 470–71 (citing MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CITY CHARTER § 4.1(a) (2017)). 
 172. In 2017, the Minneapolis City Council passed a minimum wage ordi-
nance that largely aligned with the original proposal at issue in Vasseur. See 
City Council Passes Municipal Minimum Wage Ordinance, MINNEAP-
OLISMN.GOV (June 30, 2017), http://news.minneapolismn.gov/2017/06/30/city 
-council-passes-municipal-minimum-wage-ordinance/. Vasseur may therefore 
best be understood as a debate on division between city and citizen implemen-
tation of home rule power, rather than whether that area of law properly fell 
within home responsibilities in general. 
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state law, including provisions that regulated the responsibility 
of municipalities to purchase insurance and represent police of-
ficers in all tort cases.173 Thus, the pervasiveness of existing reg-
ulation at the state level was sufficient to obviate any discussion 
of whether, in general, the area of municipal liability fell within 
the substantive scope of Minnesota’s home rule. 
Second, and more significantly, the district court decision in 
Vasseur discussed at length the limits of acceptable subject mat-
ters that might appear in a Minnesota home rule charter.174 The 
decision highlighted section 410.07 of the Minnesota Statutes, 
which allows cities to go beyond simply establishing the struc-
ture of local government. 
Subject to the limitations in this chapter provided, [a home rule char-
ter] may provide for any scheme of municipal government not incon-
sistent with the constitution, and may provide for the establishment 
and administration of all departments of a city government, and for the 
regulation of all local municipal functions, as fully as the legislature 
might have done before home rule charters for cities were authorized 
by constitutional amendment in 1896.175 
As the district court discussed, city power is encapsulated in the 
phrase “may provide for the establishment and administration 
of all departments of a city government.”176 The court held that 
the second clause of that sentence, “may provide for . . . the reg-
ulation of all local municipal functions,” demonstrates a broad 
delegation of legislative home rule power.177 A state’s delegation 
of the ability to craft a charter to a home rule city in turn gives 
that city the power to confer legislative power to either a city 
council (in the form of an ordinance) or its citizens (in the form 
of a referendum to amend the charter, if the city chooses to in-
clude that power in the charter).178 In other words, the only lim-
iting factors on what can be included in a city ordinance under 
Minnesota law is: (1) the extent to which it conflicts with state 
law;179 and (2) the legislative procedures a city elects to confer 
 
 173. Order Dismissing Petition at 5–10, Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, No. 
27-CV-16-11839 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016). 
 174. Order Granting Petition at 9–10, Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, No. 
27-CV-16-11794 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016). 
 175. MINN. STAT. § 410.07 (2017). 
 176. See Order Granting Petition at 10, Vasseur, No. 27-CV-16-11794 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016). 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See MINN. STAT. § 410.07 (allowing for legislative acts in charters so 
long as they are “not inconsistent with the constitution”); see also Order Dis-
missing Petition at 4, Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, No. 27-CV-16-11839 (Dist. 
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upon its citizens.180 As discussed in Part III, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court’s decision overturning the district court may have 
only further highlighted the changing expectation of the areas of 
law that can constitute a local concern.181 
These two cases demonstrate both the relative strength of 
home rule in Minnesota, and the extent to which judicial inter-
pretation can have a profound impact on defining the malleable 
boundaries of home rule authority. By recognizing that the rele-
vant statutes governing home rule are permissive in a given 
state, courts are more inclined to in turn set broad standards for 
what can constitute a local concern. The failure to amend the 
Minneapolis Charter in no way diminished, and actually brought 
to light, the understanding that Minnesota home rule cities may 
legislate on “any subject appropriate to the orderly conduct of 
municipal affairs.”182 As discussed in Part III, such broad statu-
tory language can create revised expectations of the areas of law 
that are suitable for legislation at the local level.183 When cou-
pled with a lack of affirmative policies in that area at the state 
level, courts should also embrace a new default presumption that 
allows cities to step up and fill these legislative voids, even in 
the face of retaliatory preemption. 
3. Arizona 
Arizona’s recent difficulties, as outlined above,184 are argu-
ably more extreme than the challenges unfolding in North Car-
olina and Minnesota.185 In those states, cities have been trying 
to carve out more power based on legislative silence at the state 
level in certain areas of law.186 In Arizona, attempts to interfere 
with local legislation bear more of a resemblance to the aggres-
sive overextension of the state creature model that originally led 
 
Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016). As the district court explained in that decision, the 
clear pervasiveness of state preemption was dispositive for striking down the 
charter amendment; the court did not see it necessary to discuss the same issues 
raised in Vasseur because the preemption was a threshold issue. Id. at 7–8. 
 180. See Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Minn. 2016) 
(per curiam). 
 181. See infra Part III.B. 
 182. Vasseur, 887 N.W.2d at 473 (quoting Markley v. City of St. Paul, 172 
N.W. 215, 216 (Minn. 1919)). 
 183. See infra Part III.B. 
 184. See supra notes 1–6, 15–16, and accompanying text. 
 185. Supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2. 
 186. In North Carolina, although the state legislature eventually imple-
mented explicitly preemptive statutory language, it had been silent on the issue 
before the passing of HB2. 
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to the pushback from home rule reformers.187 In addition to the 
energy benchmarking bill that strictly prohibits local govern-
ments from passing new legislation on related issues,188 the re-
cent bill that gives any state lawmaker the power to recommend 
to the State Attorney General that an ordinance violates state 
law, SB1487, goes a step further: it not only preempts particular 
local concerns, but potentially all future local concerns, in a way 
that circumvents judicial review entirely.189 
Home rule cities in Arizona are in the early stages of re-
sponding to these preemptive laws. In Tucson, a state legislator 
reported to the Attorney General that a local ordinance provid-
ing for the destruction of confiscated firearms, codified as section 
2-142 of the Tucson Code in 2005,190 violated a 2013 state law 
that explicitly prohibited and preempted such practices.191 The 
Attorney General filed a report, in compliance with SB1487, that 
(1) the ordinance “may violate” state law; and (2) that SB1487’s 
preemptive proscriptions could be retroactively applied, thus 
triggering SB1487’s procedures regarding potential withholding 
of state funding.192 In response, the city filed a lawsuit in state 
district court, challenging the constitutionality of SB1487, which 
was then removed to a special hearing in front of the Arizona 
Supreme Court.193 At oral argument, the discussion of SB1487 
focused on whether the power to occupy any field being regulated 
at the local level through this new preemption law effectively 
“nullif[ies] the charter authority” set forth in the state constitu-
tion.194 Especially because the city ordinance had predated both 
the state’s 2013 law and SB1487, the parties and the court ap-
peared to struggle with when to preserve local power in the face 
of reactive preemption.195 
The more deliberate nature of Arizona’s recent preemptive 
legislation, therefore, presents a unique challenge for cities: 
 
 187. See supra Part I.C. 
 188. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.36 (2016). 
 189. Id. § 41-194.01. 
 190. TUCSON, ARIZ., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-142 (2005). 
 191. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Special Relief ¶ 56, City 
of Tucson v. State, No. C20165733 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2016). 
 192. See OFFICE OF ARIZ. ATT’Y GEN., INVESTIGATIVE REP. NO. 16-002 (2016). 
 193. See Order, State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, No. CV-16-0301-SA 
(Ariz. Aug. 17, 2017). 
 194. Oral Argument at 25:28, State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, No. 
CV-16-0301-SA, (Ariz. Jan. 18, 2017) http://supremestateaz.granicus.com/ 
MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=2109#. 
 195. See id. at 13:02–15:04, 18:13–29:20, 41:23–42:15, 45:07–45:40. 
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where the intent of the state legislature is clearly geared toward 
active preemption, there is a temptation to fall back on the state 
creature framework and declare that any occupied field belongs 
to state law. But Arizona cities are afforded unusually strong 
home rule immunity that complicates the debate. Arizona’s 
home rule amendment allows any city of more than 3500 people 
to “frame a charter for its own government consistent with, and 
subject to, the Constitution and the laws of the state.”196 As 
noted in Part I,197 courts have held that “[t]he purpose of the 
home rule charter provision . . . was to render the cities adopting 
such charter provisions as nearly independent of state legisla-
tion as was possible.”198 This emphasis on municipal protections 
was further articulated with respect to municipal elections in 
City of Tucson v. State.199 In that case, the Supreme Court of 
Arizona looked at the language not just of the Arizona constitu-
tion allowing for home rule charters, but the language of the 
city’s charter as well, which provided that “[t]he provisions of the 
general laws of the State of Arizona, governing the elections of 
state and county officers, not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Charter, shall govern the said elections.”200 It then held that 
preemptive state statutes aimed at displacing the city’s election 
laws did not fall into this category of “general laws.”201 Thus, the 
court found that the combination of: (1) a clear legislative intent 
to generally give cities autonomous power; (2) the unique, and 
thus local, nature of each city’s election procedures; and (3) the 
lack of a preference for a statewide scheme from state legislature 
rendered, at least in the field of local elections, certain city ordi-
nances immune from state interference.202 
Rather than presuming that the Hunter model dictates the 
interaction between state and locality, decisions like City of Tuc-
son read the state’s home rule amendment as starting from the 
proposition that the state cannot meddle with local affairs. By 
creating an original intent in the state constitution that favors 
city power, this new default nullifies preemptive measures that 
do not sufficiently demonstrate a strong state interest before the 
 
 196. ARIZ. CONST. art. XIII, § 2. 
 197. See supra Part I.D.2.a. 
 198. City of Tucson v. Walker, 135 P.2d 223, 226 (Ariz. 1943) (quoting Ax-
berg v. City of Lincoln, 2 N.W.2d 613, 614–15 (Neb. 1942)). 
 199. City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624 (Ariz. 2012). 
 200. TUCSON, ARIZ., CHARTER Ch. XVI, § 7 (emphasis added); City of Tucson, 
273 P.3d at 629. 
 201. City of Tucson, 273 P.3d at 629. 
 202. See id. at 632. 
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ordinance in question is preempted. As discussed below, this def-
erence reduces the headwinds cities face in order to pass local 
laws in new areas in the future.203 The abandoning of a field of 
law at the state level at this point becomes more relevant to a 
court than perfunctory preemptive language in a state law. 
III.  RECONSIDERING LOCAL POWER WHERE STATE 
LAW HAS ABANDONED THE FIELD   
When a home rule state abandons a field of law, the cases 
above indicate that a court can step in and interpret an issue as 
a local concern in ways that the original home rulers may have 
not contemplated.204 This Part reexamines the legal challenges 
in each of the states discussed, and highlights the relevant fac-
tors that might lead to an outcome favoring greater protection 
from state interference. Section A revisits the litigation in North 
Carolina, and considers how, even with strong initiative statu-
tory grants, the lack of home rule sets a baseline for the potency 
of state preemption. Section B analyzes the recent court deci-
sions in Minnesota and the extent to which permissive home rule 
language can allow courts to eschew concerns that the given area 
might encroach on an area of law traditionally reserved for 
statewide regulation. Section C applies these principles to the 
preemptive legislation in Arizona and argues that the clear ab-
dication of any legitimate state interest likely makes recent state 
preemption laws untenable in a home rule state. Section D uses 
these examples to discuss the model of local power that courts 
should consider going forward in home rule states. Ultimately, 
this Part concludes that the combination of permissive home rule 
amendments and an abdication of legitimate state interest in a 
particular area of law has given courts the incentive to recali-
brate traditional limits of local power. It further argues that 
courts in home rule states should adopt a rebuttable presump-
tion to review state preemption in an abandoned field of law, and 
consider allowing city ordinances to operate in that field barring 
a demonstration of legitimate statewide concern. 
 
 203. See infra Part III.C. 
 204. See supra Part II.B. 
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A. NORTH CAROLINA AND THE PROBLEM OF PREEMPTION 
WITHOUT HOME RULE 
As set forth in Part II, the North Carolina constitution does 
not contain a home rule provision.205 While state laws have to 
some extent given the municipalities of North Carolina broad in-
itiative power,206 the lack of home rule there indicates a strong 
legislative intent to specifically not confer special spheres of 
power protected from state interference. And while cases like 
Homebuilder’s Ass’n push back on the notion that North Caro-
lina is purely governed by the tenets of Dillon’s Rule,207 even 
broad statutory grants of initiative authority leave municipali-
ties relatively beholden to the state creature model. 
The limited litigation over HB2 confirms just how important 
the presence of a home rule amendment is for municipal protec-
tion, even if there are other schemes in place that confer local 
power expansively. In the fight over the original bathroom bill, 
there seemed to be little dispute that the preemptive language 
of HB2 definitively ruled out invoking arguments of local auton-
omy. Indeed, the main challenges to the bill were based not on 
whether the state could preempt the city on that issue, but ra-
ther whether the state law itself violated federal law.208 The 
strong preemptive language of HB2 focused on the state pro-
claiming that it was “protect[ing] and safeguard[ing] the right 
and opportunity of all individuals within the State to enjoy 
equally . . . public accommodation free of discrimination,” and 
that the “regulation of discriminatory practices in places of pub-
lic accommodation is properly an issue of general, statewide con-
cern” as a result.209 Invoking public concern harkened back to 
the statute granting broad local powers, which required that lo-
cal legislation be “not contrary to State or federal law or to the 
public policy of this State.”210 This rationale allowed the state 
legislature to “supersede and preempt any ordinance, regulation, 
 
 205. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 206. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text. 
 207. See Homebuilder ’s Ass’n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 
45, 50 (N.C. 1994). 
 208. See Complaint at 1–2, United States v. North Carolina, No. 1:16-cv-425 
(M.D.N.C. May 10, 2016) (raising questions of whether HB2 violates federal law, 
but not disputing whether the state law controls over Charlotte Ordinance No. 
7056). 
 209. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-422.11 (West 2016). 
 210. Id. § 160A-4 (emphasis added). 
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resolution, or policy adopted or imposed by a unit of local govern-
ment or other political subdivision of the State” through HB2.211 
While the substantive policy of HB2 was completely repealed 
with the passing of HB142, the strong preemptive language has 
been replaced with something just as forceful. Indeed, even the 
title of the new provision, “Preemption of Regulation of Access to 
Multiple Occupancy Restrooms,” makes clear that the state leg-
islature is now (and perhaps always was) concerned mostly with 
blocking progressive social policy at the local level. 
As discussed below,212 simply asserting that an issue is of 
statewide concern does not appear to be enough to make it so, 
unless home rule does not govern municipal affairs, as is the case 
in North Carolina. If no home rule amendment is in place to con-
fer power on a municipality, courts are less likely to look for any 
intent or legitimate statewide concern claimed by a state legis-
lature, or to give a locality any more autonomous powers than 
those explicitly outlined. For North Carolina, perfunctory 
preemption language not based on actual findings on a particu-
lar issue, but which labels an issue as a general statewide con-
cern, is likely sufficient to totally preempt local legislation. Even 
arguments that purely social issues such as LGBT rights are suf-
ficiently within a municipality’s powers granted under state law 
are likely to become moot in the face of clear preemptive in-
tent.213 
B. MINNESOTA AND THE ROLE OF PERMISSIVE HOME RULE 
AMENDMENTS IN DEFINING LOCAL CONCERN 
Minnesota’s home rule provisions portend a much more pos-
itive outlook for future challenges to local legislation in home 
rule states. Unlike North Carolina, Minnesota has broad grants 
of home rule authority; simply the act of allowing “[a]ny local 
government unit when authorized by law [to] adopt a home rule 
charter for its government”214 suggests a presumption in Minne-
sota that home rule cities should have a certain amount of pro-
tection from state interference. This deference is reflected in 
precedent broadly construing home rule authority to “embrace[] 
any subject appropriate to the orderly conduct of municipal af-
fairs.”215 With such interpretations in place, it is less likely that 
 
 211. Id. § 143-422.11. 
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an ordinance will be subject to scrutiny if it attempts to chart 
new territory for local concern, because courts will understand 
that the state legislature intended its cities to have flexibility 
when the home rule amendments were passed.216 
The issue of where Minnesota courts should draw the dis-
tinction between local and statewide concern was largely obvi-
ated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Vasseur.217 While ac-
knowledging that the “all local municipal functions” clause of 
section 410.07 “may be broad” in the relevant subject matters it 
could encompass, the Supreme Court felt it sufficient to resolve 
the issue on the extent to which the charter had conferred legis-
lative authority in a structural sense to its citizens.218 But in so 
doing, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Vasseur at 
least allowed for the possibility that traditional social issues like 
the minimum wage conceivably serve a local municipal function. 
The district court ruling was primarily concerned with defining 
the outer limit of an acceptable piece of local legislation, regard-
less of its form,219 and the higher court was content to settle the 
matter on a threshold issue. Had the Minnesota Supreme Court 
addressed the district court’s findings more directly, it likely 
would have had to reconcile Vasseur with its first case involving 
section 410.07, which held that the power delegated to the cities 
in Minnesota allows a city to “embrace[] any subject appropriate 
to the orderly conduct of municipal affairs.”220 Instead, the 
Vasseur court framed the reach of local power as a question of 
 
 216. Cf. Order Granting Petition, Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, No. 27-CV-
16-11794 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016) (declining to analyze whether the state 
minimum wage laws preempt the proposed charter amendment in any way). 
 217. Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 2016). 
 218. See id. at 470–72. 
 219. See Order Granting Petition at 6, Vasseur, No. 27-CV-16-11794 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016) (“This dispute centers upon what can be the subject of 
a charter amendment.”). 
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attempt at circumscribing local rule to certain subject matters, therefore, will 
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form, and left the question of acceptable subjects of home rule 
open to further interpretation.221 
Permissive home rule language certainly still matters when 
there are alleged conflicts with state law. In those cases, Minne-
sota courts have preferred that the state adhere to explicit terms 
when attempting to overturn a local ordinance.222 The district 
court decision in Bicking illustrates the extent to which strong 
and pervasive preemption influences a court to decide against a 
city.223 If such language is not present, however, Bicking and 
Vasseur suggest that courts are more likely to recognize how an 
ordinance and state law might coexist, even if they discuss the 
same issue. In Vasseur, there was never a question as to whether 
there was a state law governing minimum wage.224 In cases like 
Living Wage, this would potentially be enough to rule out the 
existence of minimum wage law at the local level outright.225 But 
in Minnesota, and states with similar home rule amendments, 
stronger implied delegations of local power allow instead for 
courts to start from the presumption that local interests can gov-
ern a wide range of subjects conceivably tied to the proper gov-
ernance of a locality, such as promoting general welfare through 
increased minimum wages. Courts then require an explicit and 
deliberate indication from the state that it (1) either intends to 
occupy the field of law at issue; or (2) has at minimum passed a 
state law that is incompatible with the ordinance at issue. Where 
a state has not indicated a strong interest through an affirmative 
policy, or otherwise appears to be passing a preemptive law in a 
retaliatory manner, courts should recognize that abdication as 
an opportunity to expand the understanding of boundaries at 
which home rule cities can operate. 
 
 221. Vasseur, 887 N.W.2d at 472. 
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C. ARIZONA AND ABDICATION OF LEGITIMATE STATE PURPOSE 
As discussed above, cities in Arizona often face deliberate 
challenges to their ability to pass local laws, but they also enjoy 
heightened home rule immunity that other states do not.226 
Cases like City of Tucson v. State demonstrate, furthermore, that 
Arizona courts are willing to rule in favor of cities facing preemp-
tive measures in certain situations.227 In general, having a per-
missive home rule may not be enough to fully overcome attempts 
at preemption.228 However, case law addressing preemption is-
sues in Arizona recognizes that declarations of statewide inter-
est cannot summarily snuff out local ordinances originally in-
tended to be “as nearly independent of state legislation as 
. . . possible.”229 In the context of potential legal challenges to the 
more recent brand of preemptive state laws, such interpretations 
bode well for arguments that emphasize the importance of exist-
ing local control at the time of preemption, even where that 
preemptive intent is overt. 
In City of Tucson v. State, the state was careful to distin-
guish its attempt at preemption from prior holdings that pro-
tected local control over elections.230 The state argued that the 
inclusion of specific language in the statute citing a need to gov-
ern local elections uniformly was sufficient to justify the conclu-
sion that “the conduct of elections . . . is a matter of statewide 
concern.”231 The court found that this statutory language was 
not dispositive.232 Because the state’s home rule charter was 
clear in its intention to confer inherently local issues to cities, 
the mere inclusion of this perfunctory preemptive language was 
not enough to overcome previously recognized home rule immun-
ity.233 Even the inclusion of special language pointing to “find-
ings [made] by the legislature” was insufficient to override the 
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presumption toward favoring the city’s autonomy under Ari-
zona’s home rule amendment.234 Using tactics similar to those 
used by the drafters of HB2 in North Carolina,235 here state leg-
islators attempted to graft claims of statewide concern to the 
preemptive statute without any demonstration that this was the 
case, and only in response to a city action in a particular area of 
law. Unlike North Carolina, however, courts in Arizona have rec-
ognized a constitutional presumption in favor of local authority 
that rejects the tenets of Dillon’s Rule.236 And while the decision 
in City of Tucson focused on a narrow area of state law—the 
structuring of local governments through elections—the court’s 
willingness to flatly reject the state’s superficial claims of 
statewide concern indicates that more is needed from a state to 
preempt local issues. 
Arizona state legislators’ more recent attempts to under-
mine local action make similar claims that certain fields are sud-
denly of general concern. But the state, in passing both the en-
ergy benchmarking bill, as well as SB1487, only attempted to 
demonstrate a statewide interest in passing the laws after the 
local ordinance attempts to fill a legislative void. In the case of 
the energy bill, the Arizona legislature appears to have abdi-
cated any interest in legislating on issues of energy usage.237 Its 
claim, therefore, that “small businesses are particularly sensi-
tive to costs and expenses incurred in complying with regulatory 
actions of a city or town,” as a justification for complete prohibi-
tion of any local regulation, rings hollow in that context.238 Fur-
thermore, the state law governing the destruction of confiscated 
firearms only came eight years after Tucson had passed its own 
ordinance on the issue and been engaged in regulation at the lo-
cal level.239 Such retroactive measures call into question the ex-
tent to which home rule can push back against statewide concern 
that appears as concerned with undermining city action as occu-
pying a field for statewide regulation. 
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All of these preemptive laws are likely at odds with City of 
Tucson v. State for two important reasons. First, building off the 
understanding from Minnesota’s home rule regarding the types 
of subject matter that can be contemplated as local issues,240 as 
well as Arizona precedent that recognizes the intent to create 
“independent” localities through the charter provision,241 it can 
certainly be argued that regulation of areas ranging from gun 
safety to climate and energy regulation may be characterized as 
local issues. In the recent challenge to SB1487, the city of Tucson 
argued it was unlikely that the legislature had contemplated 
that home rule would only extend to limited areas like elections 
and real property.242 Therefore, although the ruling in City of 
Tucson dealt exclusively with the area of local elections, conclud-
ing based on that decision that home rule immunity only func-
tions in narrow fields of law, such as municipal elections is at 
odds with fluid understandings of what is required to operate a 
local government.243 
Second, and more importantly, the preemptive laws, espe-
cially SB1487, signal an intent to occupy potentially every field 
of law, but only in a reactionary sense, after the locality has cho-
sen to pass affirmative legislation in that area. The court in City 
of Tucson v. State was skeptical of language in that case’s 
preemptive statute because it did not make any showing of 
statewide interest in that field beyond boilerplate language.244 
Here, too, state preemption laws that attempt to occupy a field, 
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after a city has already filled that void, will likely have to demon-
strate that there is an actual state interest that goes beyond 
pushing back against local power in general. This showing will 
certainly be required in the case of the energy benchmarking 
bill,245 where sponsors of the state law seemed to signal that its 
underlying purpose was to block city regulation in general, ra-
ther than preserve the area for implementation of a statewide 
scheme.246 In the case of SB1487, the state’s attempt to unilat-
erally make conclusions of law regarding conflicts between state 
and local law push too far past the protective shield of home rule 
immunity. It removes the role of the judiciary in interpreting the 
boundaries between state and local power,247 and it indicates a 
desire to chill future local legislation by the prospect of defund-
ing a locality based on the findings of only the Attorney Gen-
eral.248 Like in City of Tucson v. State, such attempts to occupy 
a field either retroactively or in perpetuity restrict the reach of 
home rule far more than was ever intended, and should make 
courts skeptical of the constitutionality of the state’s attempt to 
preempt an already-occupied field. Thus, it is through cases like 
City of Tucson v. State that cities can also find an opportunity to 
reframe the debate: where home rule language has been inter-
preted to confer broad and even independent authority on a 
state’s subdivisions, a demonstrable abdication of any legitimate 
state interest in a particular area of law should be sufficient to 
recognize and favor home rule immunity on that issue. 
D. A NEW STANDARD FOR LOCAL POWER IN ABANDONED FIELDS 
The cases discussed in the preceding Sections demonstrate 
the challenges cities face where a state preempts local law. They 
also highlight the relevant factors courts may start examining 
more carefully in determining whether those preemptive 
measures should be upheld when a state has effectively aban-
doned a field of law. In future cases involving home rule and local 
preemption, lawyers advocating on behalf of localities should 
take note of permissive home rule language and the precedent 
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that informs its interpretation, as well as signs of state legisla-
tures abdicating concern for an issue at the state level, to argue 
that home rule considerations outweigh the state creature model 
of Hunter.249 Doing so can establish sound legal bases for either 
distinguishing or overruling state laws that purport to preempt 
a city ordinance, without offering a substantive policy to take its 
place. 
The current state of preemption law where the state has 
abandoned the field is untenable and needs to be reconsidered. 
The roles of cities have dramatically expanded from the days 
since Dillon’s Rule and Hunter set restrictive limits on the areas 
in which they could govern. As cities grow in size and signifi-
cance, they need to be able to respond to the concerns of their 
citizens in a meaningful way,250 whether in areas of more purely 
social interest, like civil rights,251 or in areas that blur the line 
between social concern and municipal administration, such as 
minimum wage.252 Yet the current model of city-state preemp-
tion has used these outdated principles to push back against lo-
cal power in a way that is based on technical statutory construc-
tion, rather than meaningful balance between state and local 
power. This imbalance is most stark where state preemption is 
reactive to local ordinances, and does not forward affirmative 
policies as a justification. Cities are left wondering how to re-
spond to their citizens’ concerns when their parent political bod-
ies are unwilling to step up to the plate, and, at the same time, 
are telling them they cannot fashion their own remedies. 
The potential for overreach in state preemption, therefore, 
warrants a new standard where the state has previously aban-
doned the field of law at issue. This Note proposes that, in home 
rule states where the state government has abandoned a field of 
law, but then attempts to preempt a local ordinance, courts 
should adopt a rebuttable presumption to review whether a le-
gitimate state interest can actually be gleaned from the statute. 
Where a state can demonstrate that it is preempting an ordi-
nance because it is attempting to implement its own statewide 
scheme and thus occupy that field, courts should find that the 
typical preemption analysis applies, whereby state law controls 
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if it cannot coexist with the ordinance.253 But where it appears 
that a state is attempting to circumvent home rule powers and 
pass the preemptive statute without forwarding an affirmative 
policy, courts in home rule states should presume that home rule 
protections allow cities to govern in that area. This model closely 
mirrors the underlying logic of City of Tucson v. State,254 but is 
likely applicable to most home rule states. A recognition, at the 
state constitutional level, that local power should be protected 
should be sufficient for courts to justify that: (1) local concern 
can be expanded on a subject-by-subject basis; and (2) preemp-
tive laws that restrict local power, without filling that void, are 
at odds with constitutional intent. By looking toward the under-
lying motivations of these preemptive statutes, a more balanced 
evaluation of these preemptive laws should emerge and allow 
cities to govern in abandoned fields, without the chilling effects 
of over-extensive state interference. 
A model that redefines the limits of legislative power inevi-
tably faces potential pitfalls. The first concern implicates the 
strong legal notions of federalism that underpin the entire mu-
nicipal legal regime. The Supreme Court’s holding in Hunter was 
premised in large part on the need to clearly separate spheres of 
power.255 A push toward expanding local power beyond the dic-
tates of a state, then, would seem to fly in the face of the legal 
wisdom organizing the relationship between city and state legis-
latures. It also would appear to argue in direct contradiction of 
clear legal precedent holding that cities are essentially powerless 
and thus subject to any expansions or restrictions of power a 
state chooses to impose upon them.256 
But what distinguishes these modern statutes from more 
traditional instances of preemption is the lack of substantive law 
underlying them. Again, the absence of any real demonstration 
of intent to occupy the fields at issue creates a stronger rationale 
for courts to find that preemption without an underlying state 
interest is not in line with the type of top-down delegation of 
power envisioned by Dillon. Furthermore, the model proposed 
does not envision that courts are likely (or willing) to overrule 
Dillon’s Rule in places like North Carolina, where home rule has 
not been implemented in a more than de facto manner. Because 
there is no constitutional recognition of local power in those 
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states, there is no reason for a court to infer that the state ever 
intended to delegate local power beyond what lies in its statutes. 
In this way, the state creature model will be preserved in the 
states that never abdicated that structural power. Otherwise, an 
emphasis on the illusory nature of the preemptive language of 
statutes in home rule states should allay fears that Hunter, or 
the integrity of a state legislature’s power, is in any real danger. 
The other, perhaps more important concern, is whether a 
lack of affirmative policy is truly a type of legislative abandon-
ment, and whether a presumption in favor of local power cedes 
too much power in a precarious balance between state and city. 
Indeed, both conservative and even more progressive home rul-
ers were concerned with either a preservation of that traditional 
role of local government, or of a rather measured expansion of 
local power, because they feared that too much power at the local 
level would upset the balance needed to run political bodies 
larger than the cities they sought to protect.257 Similarly, schol-
ars of home rule have felt the need to push back against notions 
that home rule should be used to champion local autonomy.258 
Therefore, modern conceptions of home rule need to be mindful 
that the original theories that motivated home rule reform were 
all united by the understanding that “[h]ome rule, like the state 
creature concept that preceded it, was a way to structure city 
power, not simply unleash it.”259 
It is true that a return to home rule immunity, and thus en-
hanced local power, requires measured consideration. States 
that have not enacted an affirmative policy in a certain area may 
still be doing so by choice, and argue that this choice not to act 
does not lessen the field’s relevance to statewide concern. But 
two points are relevant here. First, as noted above, the decision 
to enact home rule signals, at some level, an intent to push leg-
islation down to the local level to the extent it is possible. There-
fore, if home rule amendments are to be given their true effect, 
a state’s legislative choice must start at the constitutional level. 
Second, the model proposed does not suppose that every instance 
of legislative abandonment at the state level will result in a city 
being able to effectively become autonomous in that area of law. 
Rather, it emphasizes the importance of courts of law to weigh 
that abandonment as a rebuttable presumption in favor of local 
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power that can nevertheless be limited or restricted. A state 
could pass a preemptive law not unlike the ones discussed above 
as a device to challenge an ordinance, and then explain why the 
decision not to occupy that area of field truly has an underlying 
rationale. In other words, a recalibrated default in favor of local 
power in certain situations is no more than a starting point. In 
this model, then, courts will play the same role they always have 
in determining boundaries between local and state concern, as 
well as the legitimacy of the underlying interests in those con-
cerns. 
The benefits of this model, meanwhile, are clear. It allows 
cities a renewed opportunity to enact meaningful reform and re-
main the laboratories of democracy that urban reformers have 
always envisioned them to be.260 In areas of law that have been 
truly abandoned at the state level, cities should be allowed to 
step up and attempt to resolve issues that courts have increas-
ingly contemplated to be local in nature.261 In the same vein, this 
model also restores the role of courts in making determinations 
on the reach of state constitutions, rather than relying on stat-
utes that preempt ordinances based on their technical construc-
tion. As cities evolve, so too should the legal system’s under-
standing of their needs, and the ways in which the law has 
already recognized that those needs should be protected. This 
model strikes a balance between those needs while still allowing 
for meaningful preemption when a state can demonstrate legiti-
mate interest. 
  CONCLUSION   
The purpose of this Note has been to redefine and apply 
home rule immunity to modern instances of municipal legal 
preemption. It advocates for a focus on the language of home rule 
amendments, the underlying purpose of those amendments, and 
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the extent to which a state has abandoned the preempted field 
of law as a way to balance city-state relations and redefine local 
power. And it proposes a standard of a rebuttable presumption 
as the device by which courts can play a pivotal role in determin-
ing when state action has violated constitutionally recognized 
home rule immunity. 
Preemption should always be about balancing state and city 
power. The current state of preemption at the local level, how-
ever, jeopardizes both the meaning of that balance, as well as the 
significance of localities in a modern democracy. Over time, the 
purposes of cities have been redefined; from constrained corpo-
rate entities, to recognized but ultimately subservient political 
subdivisions, to modern laboratories of democracy with sophisti-
cated structures and public policies, the trend has been toward 
recalibrating the rules, decisions, and statutes that have defined 
what it means to be a body of local government. Because the 
needs of cities have paralleled this change, courts should recog-
nize with more frequency that reliance on traditional rules or-
ganizing city-state relations needs to be reevaluated from time 
to time. And because of the power of home rule, there is a sound 
legal basis on which that realization can allow cities to regain a 
modern sense of local power, and pivot toward solving modern 
challenges in the face of legislative voids. 
